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Academic Dismissals: A Due
Process Anomaly
Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
L INTRODUCTION
The 1975 Supreme Court decision in Goss v. Lopez' established
that elementary and secondary students are entitled to notice and
some kind of hearing prior to a short term suspension for miscon-
duct;2 a fortiori, notice and hearing would be necessary prior to ex-
pulsion for misconduct. What was left unclear was the range of
educational activities and penalties to which constitutional proce-
dural due process rights apply. Ingraham v. Wright3 filled in one
missing piece when the Court held that corporal punishment in
public schools does not require prior notice and hearing to comply
with the due process clause.4 Lower courts have been dealing with
other variations as they arise. In general, misconduct penalties
which are perceived to be less severe than suspension, e.g., re-
stricting participation in extra-curricular activities, have not trig-
gered constitutional due process.5
The situation in public universities has been similar to that in
public elementary and secondary schools. Although the Supreme
Court has never reviewed a case of disciplinary dismissal or sus-
pension at the college or university level, the lower courts had
reached a consensus by the time Goss was decided that procedural
1. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
2. Id. at 572-76.
3. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
4. Id. at 682. Since common law remedies are available to the student if the
punishment is excessive, less procedural protection prior to imposition of the
punishment is suitable. Ingraham also held that corporal punishment in
public schools does not violate the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual
punishment clause.
5. For a review of cases in which participation in high school athletics was held
not to be protected by the due process clause, see Note, High School Athletics
and Due Process: Notice of Eligibility Rules, 57 NEB. I REv. 877, 881-82 nn.26-
30 (1978). Cf. Compagno v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, No. CV 77-L-192
(D. Neb. Sept. 16, 1977) (due process attaches to athletic participation); Teare
v. Board of Educ., No. CV 77-1,190 (D. Neb. Sept. 16, 1977) (same).
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due process rights attached to students in higher education prior
to disciplinary dismissals.6 But whether college students have a
liberty or property interest in continued attendance has never
been definitively established.7 If they do have such interests, the
6. The landmark decision in this area was Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ.,
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), which held that stu-
dents at public universities are entitled to notice and some opportunity for a
hearing prior to expulsion for misconduct. The Dixon court specified that the
notice must "contain a statement of the specific... charges.... The nature
of the hearing should vary depending on the circumstances of the particular
case." Id. at 158. The "rudiments of an adversary hearing," id. at 159, are
mandated, including furnishing the names of witnesses against the student
and a statement of the facts to which each witness is expected to testify. The
student must have an opportunity to present his or her side of the story, in-
cluding witnesses and evidence. If the board which has final authority does
not itself conduct the hearing, a written report of the hearing must be pre-
pared and made available to the student. A "full dress judicial hearing, with
the right to cross-examine witnesses," id., is not required.
Subsequent cases reinforced the holding of Dixon and fleshed out the
specific procedures necessary. See, e.g., Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 462
F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1972) (a specially appointed disciplinary panel is satisfac-
tory); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (student's right to
counsel depends on presence of other factors influencing student's overall
ability to defend against the charges); French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333
(E.D. La. 1969) (right to counsel exists where prosecutor has strong legal
qualifications); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747
(W.D. La. 1968) (recommends written and promulgated rules and an appeal
system; open or closed hearing not required); Esteban v. Central Mo. State
College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), a'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied 398 U.S. 965 (1970) (college must provide statement of precise
charges at least ten days before hearing student should have opportunity to
confront witnesses, to present his or her case to person or group with the
responsibility of deciding the facts and the penalty, to examine the college's
evidence in advance, and to have counsel present but not to conduct stu-
dent's case; decision must be based solely on evidence presented at hearing;
either side may record hearing); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal.
2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Ct. App. 1967) (need not follow judicial rules of evi-
dence).
7. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961), applied the due process clause "[wihenever a governmental
body acts so as to injure an individual." Id. at 155. The issue of disciplinary
dismissal was resolved in this context, before the liberty and property con-
cepts were developed by the United States Supreme Court in the line of
cases highlighted by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975), Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d
843 (10th Cir. 1975), and Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147
(M.D. Pa. 1978), based their holdings that procedural due process attaches to
academic dismissals on the finding of a liberty or property interest. Other
academic dismissal cases cited in this article did not rely on the presence or
absence of a liberty or property interest. In most cases, the student alleged
arbitrariness and capriciousness and did not rest the case on liberty or prop-
erty.
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nature of the procedural protections to which they are entitled
prior to academic dismissals has never been specified.8 It was with
hope of receiving answers to one or both of these questions that
Board of Curators v. Horowitz9 was presented to the Supreme
Court.
II. THE FACTS
Charlotte Horowitz obtained a bachelor's degree in chemistry
from Barnard College and a master's in psychology from Columbia
University. She pursued graduate work at Duke University and at
the National Institutes of Health. Her grades at each institution
were superb, as were her scores on the Graduate Record Examina-
tion and the Medical College Admissions Test.'0 On the basis of
these academic achievements and enthusiastic recommendations,
she was admitted with advanced standing to the University of Mis-
souri-Kansas City Medical School" in the fall of 1971.12 She began
her studies at UMKC in approximately the third year of a four year
curriculum.
13
The studies during the last two years are organized into rota-
tions in various medical disciplines. 14 During her first year at
UMKC, Horowitz received credit for six rotations,15 but in the
spring of that year (1972) her performance in the pediatrics rota-
tion was deemed deficient by several faculty members. UMKC dis-
tinguishes receiving credit for work from satisfactory performance
in a rotation.16 The pediatrics faculty complained of her perform-
ance in "clinical patient-oriented settings,"'1 7 of her erratic attend-
ance at clinical sessions, and of her lack of concern for personal
hygiene. 18 Because her deficient performance continued, in July
1972, Horowitz was placed on probation. 19
The process set up at UMKC for reviewing academic progress
begins with the Council on Evaluation, which is composed of
faculty and students. A Coordinating Committee, composed of
8. See notes 88-93 & accompanying text infra.
9. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
10. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1318, rehearing denied, 542 F.2d
1335 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
11. Hereinafter referred to as UMKC.
12. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 80 (1978).
13. Brief for Respondent at 3, Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
14. 435 U.S. at 80.
15. Brief for Respondent at 3.
16. 435 U.S. at 104 & n.18 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
17. Id. at 80 (majority opinion).
18. Id.
19. 538 F.2d at 1319.
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faculty, may review the decisions of the Council,20 and the Dean
makes the ultimate decisions on retention or dismissal.21 The
rules do not provide for notice to the student or an opportunity to
be heard by either the Coordinating Committee or the Council.22
The July notification to Horowitz of her probationary status fol-
lowed a review by the Council on Evaluation, and a discussion
among Horowitz,23 the Dean, the Chairman of the Council on Eval-
uation, and Horowitz's faculty advisor.24 After the discussion, the
Dean notified Horowitz by letter that she had been placed on pro-
bation and again specified her deficiencies.25
"Faculty dissatisfaction with respondent's clinical performance
continued during the following year."26 In December,27 the Coun-
cil on Evaluation again reviewed her record and recommended
that she be continued on probation and that she not be considered
for graduation in June 1973.28 It further recommended that, unless
she showed radical improvement in clinical competence and sev-
eral other areas, she should be dismissed from the medical school
in June 1973. The Coordinating Committee approved these recom-
mendations. In January and February the Dean informed her of
these decisions at a meeting with her and also by letter.2 9
Horowitz appealed the decision not to allow her to graduate. As
part of the appeal process, seven practical examinations by local
physicians were conducted. Two of the physicians recommended
she be allowed to graduate in June on schedule; two recommended
she be dropped from the medical school immediately; three recom-
mended she be continued on probation and allowed additional
time to demonstrate clinical proficiency.30 Following receipt of
these recommendations, the Council on Evaluation and the Coor-
dinating Committee reaffirmed that Horowitz could not graduate
in June. She was notified of this decision by the Dean in May.3 '
Later in May, the Council again met to discuss whether
Horowitz should be allowed to continue in school beyond June,
and recommended that, "'barring receipt of any reports that [she]
20. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
21. 435 U.S. at 80.
22. Id.
23. 538 F.2d at 1319.
24. Brief for Petitioner at 6.
25. 538 F.2d at 1319.
26. 435 U.S. at 81.
27. 538 F.2d at 1319.
28. 435 U.S. at 81.
29. 538 F.2d at 1319.
30. 435 U.S. at 81.
31. 538 F.2d at 1320.
[Vol. 58:519
ACADEMIC DISMISSALS
has improved radically, [she] not be allowed to re-enroll." 32
When reports of all rotations had been received, the Council reaf-
firmed its recommendation that she be dismissed. This position
was accepted by the Coordinating Committee and by the Dean,
33
and Horowitz was notified of her dismissal by letter in July 1973.4
She appealed to the Provost for Health Science, but he sustained
the school's action.
Throughout this lengthy process, Horowitz was never allowed
to appear before the Council on Evaluation or the Coordinating
Committee.3 6 She did, however, have numerous meetings with her
faculty adviser, the Dean, and the Chairman of the Council on
Evaluation. At these meetings her deficiencies in clinical perform-
ance were discussed, suggestions were made as to what improve-
ments were necessary, and Horowitz was afforded the opportunity
to respond to the allegations regarding her performance.
3 7
III. THE DECISION
Horowitz filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 198338 in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Missouri. She asked for
declaratory and injunctive relief and damages.39 Her action was
based on the theory that she had a liberty interest in continuing
her medical education at the state operated university.4 This lib-
erty interest entitled her to procedural due process rights, includ-
ing notice and a hearing which she alleged had been denied her.4 1
She also alleged substantive due process violations.4 2 The district
court dismissed her complaint after a trial, asserting that she had
been accorded both substantive and procedural due process.
43
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed and remanded with instructions to order the University to
conduct a hearing on Horowitz's dismissal.44 Building upon Board
32. 435 U.S. at 82. This was a restatement of the Council's original recommenda-
tion when it placed her on probation in December 1972.
33. Id.
34. 538 F.2d at 1320.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 435 U.S. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
38. (1976).
39. Horowitz v. Curators, 447 F. Supp. 1102, 1104 (W.D. Mo. 1975), rev'd, 538 F.2d
1317, rehearing denied, 542 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
40. 435 U.S. at 80. Horowitz did not claim a property interest. See text accompa-
nying note 100 infra.
41. Id. at 80.
42. Id. at 91-92.
43. 447 F. Supp. 1102 (W.D. Mo. 1975), rev'd, 538 F.2d 1317, rehearing denied, 542
F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
44. 538 F.2d at 1321.
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of Regents v. Roth,45 the court of appeals stated Horowitz had
"been stigmatized by her dismissal in such a way that she will be
unable to continue her medical education, and her chances of re-
turning to employment in a medically related field are severely
damaged."46 While acknowledging that the distinction between
misconduct and academic dismissals may be valid under some cir-
cumstances, the court concluded that the circumstances of this
case demanded a hearing.47
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari4 8 "to con-
sider what procedures must be accorded to a student at a state ed-
ucational institution whose dismissal may constitute a deprivation
of 'liberty' or 'property' within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment."4 9 On March 1, 1978, the Supreme Court reversed the
Eighth Circuit.5 0 The Court unanimously agreed that if Horowitz
had a liberty or property interest in continuing her medical educa-
tion at UMKC and was thereby entitled to procedural due process,
sufficient procedure had been afforded her to comply with four-
teenth amendment requirements.5 ' A majority of the Court, with
three Justices dissenting, also decided not to remand for consider-
ation of Horowitz's substantive due process claim because "no
showing of arbitrariness or capriciousness has been made.
'52
The Court's decision for UMKC was unanimous; the reasoning
45. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). A non-tenured college teacher was not entitled to a hear-
ing on the non-renewal of his contract, because he did not allege any stigma
tantamount to a deprivation of liberty.
46. 538 F.2d at 1321.
47. Id. (footnote omitted). Since it reversed the decision on procedural due proc-
ess grounds, the Eighth Circuit did not reach the substantive due process
issue. Id. at 1321 n.5. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied, 542 F.2d
1335 (8th Cir. 1976), but three judges filed an opinion stating that a rehearing
should be granted on the basis of Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), which
was decided between the Eighth Circuit's original decision and the denial of
rehearing. In Bishop, the Court held that a city policeman had neither a
property nor a liberty interest in his job which entitled him to a hearing prior
to his dismissal. Since the reasons for his dismissal were not made public,
the court stated he could not claim reputational injury, i.e., a liberty interest
deprivation.
Those favoring a rehearing pointed out that Bishop clarified that Horowitz
was not deprived of a liberty interest, because there was no public disclosure
of the reasons for her dismissal. 542 F.2d at 1335. They further stated that
even "if due process rights were involved ... Horowitz received all the proc-
ess that was called for under the circumstances," id. at 1335-36, because she
had notice of her deficiencies, was aware of the danger of dismissal, and was
given the opportunity to correct those deficiencies. Id. at 1336.
48. 430 U.S. 964 (1977).
49. 435 U.S. at 80.
50. Id. at 78.
51. Id. at 85.
52. Id. at 91-92. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented.
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underlying the decision was not. Justice Rehnquist delivered the
opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, Powell and Stevens fully joined. This opinion indicated
that for academic dismissals procedural due process does not ne-
cessitate even an informal hearing. Justice Powell also filed a sep-
arate concurrence stating that he read the Court's opinion as
"upholding the District Court's view that respondent was dis-
missed for academic deficiencies rather than unsatisfactory per-
sonal conduct, and that in these circumstances she was accorded
due process.
'5 3
Justice White concurred in the judgment and with the opinion
in part, but believed it "unnecessary to decide whether respondent
had a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest or pre-
cisely what minimum procedures were required.... Whatever
that minimum is, the procedures accorded her satisfied or ex-
ceeded that minimum."' He disagreed with the majority's indica-
tion that no hearing or opportunity to respond is required.
55
Justice Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
agreed that Horowitz received adequate due process, but dis-
agreed with the opinion of the Court that she "was entitled to even
less procedural protection than she received."5 6 He also stated
that characterization of the dismissal as academic or disciplinary
is irrelevant to the amount of procedure required.5 7 Finally, he
would have remanded for resolution of respondent's substantive
due process claim.5
8
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan joined, believed
it unnecessary, as did Justice White, to argue about the "extent or
type of procedural protection"5 9 required. Whatever process was
due, Horowitz received it. But he agreed with Justice Marshall
that the case should be remanded for consideration of the substan-
tive due process claim.
60
IV. GENERAL ANALYSIS OF DECISION
All nine justices agreed that Horowitz had received sufficient
procedural protection; there was disagreement on nearly every-
thing else. The heart of the majority opinion focused on what proc-
ess was due the student prior to her dismissal from medical school
53. Id. at 92-93 (PowelL J., concurring).
54. Id. at 96 (White, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
55. Id. at 96-97.
56. Id. at 97 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 103-04.
58. Id. at 107-08.
59. Id. at 109 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
60. Id.
1979]
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for inadequate academic performance, assuming she had a right to
due process at all. Goss v. Lopez6 1 was the Court's starting point
in deciding the issues presented by Horowitz: (1) whether the
process afforded Horowitz satisfied the requirements of Goss; (2)
whether less stringent standards suffice for academic dismissals
than for disciplinary suspensions or expulsions; and (3) if so, a
definition of the outlines of this less stringent due process stan-
dard.
Goss set forth the minimum procedures necessary for short
term suspensions from school: "oral or written notice of the
charges" '62 and "if [the student] denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have, and an opportunity to present his
side of the story."63 Goss does not require a formal hearing,64 so
long as the student has a chance to explain his conduct and "put it
in what he deems the proper context."65
61. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Goss was the first decision applying procedural due proc-
ess protection to students, but it followed a long line of cases establishing
when due process protections were required and what process was due in
other circumstances. See note 81 infra. Goss held procedural protections ap-
ply because students have a property interest created by mandatory school
attendance laws and a liberty interest in reputation which could be damaged
by misconduct charges. But regarding the liberty interest, see Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976).
The Court's decision in Goss was five to four. A vigorous dissent denied
the existence of a liberty or property interest and stated that, consequently,
the Court should not impose any notice or hearing requirements for short
term disciplinary suspensions. 419 U.S. at 584 (Powell, J., dissenting). Three
justices in the Goss majority who are still on the Court (Justices Brennan,
White and Marshall) indicated in Horowitz that they believed some hearing
should be required for academic dismissals. Correspondingly, three of the
four Goss dissenters (Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell and Rehnquist)
were in the majority in Horowitz, agreeing that no hearing was necessary.
Justices Blackmun and Stewart take different positions in the two decisions.
While Justice Blackmun would not have required a hearing of any kind in
Goss, he would require a hearing in Horowitz. Justice Stewart, on the other
hand, advocated a required opportunity to be heard in Goss, but no hearing
in Horowitz. See 419 U.S. at 566; text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
62. 419 U.S. at 581.
63. Id.
64. This contrasts with the adversarial elements necessary to a fair hearing in
other contexts. The Court in Goss pointed out that it was not requiring that
the hearing be adversarial, or that students be allowed to be represented by
counsel, to cross-examine witnesses or to call witnesses. Id. at 583. Hearings
for disciplinary expulsion or longer term suspensions must be more formal,
id. at 584, although the degree of formality varies according to the circum-
stances. See generally D. Gilmore, The Continuing Responsibility of Due
Process in Judicial Programs and Judicial Issues: The Case of the University
and the Constitution (1974) (unpublished study materials by University of
Georgia Office of Judicial Programs); note 6 supra.
65. 419 U.S. at 584. Whether it would be appropriate to use this less formal hear-
ing in a permanent academic dismissal is not resolved by the Court in
[Vol. 58:519
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Whether the process afforded Horowitz satisfied the less strin-
gent Goss standard is never clearly answered. Justices Brennan,
66
White,67 Marshall,6 8 and Blackmun6 9 seemed to believe the Goss
requirements were met, and that the Court should make no further
inquiry. These justices agreed with Justice Marshall that the re-
peated meetings gave Horowitz "at least three opportunities 'to
present her side of the story.' ,7 0 But the Rehnquist opinion does
not rest upon a factual determination that Horowitz had any kind
of hearing at all.
Justice Marshall stated that the core of the Rehnquist opin-
ion-answering whether less stringent standards will suffice for an
academic dismissal-is dicta.71 But it is dicta only if the majority
believed Horowitz received some opportunity to be heard. The
justices joining in the Rehnquist opinion never stated that she did
receive a hearing of some sort, and the opinion reads as though
they believed she did not. Justice Powell most clearly implies that
he does not believe Horowitz received sufficient due process under
the misconduct standards established by Goss.72 If Justice Mar-
shall is correct that the core of the opinion is dicta, then the other
four justices73 joining in Rehnquist's majority opinion must have
believed Horowitz received a hearing of some sort, but neverthe-
less felt compelled to spell out their belief that less stringent
standards are adequate.
The majority presented a clearer answer to the question of
whether standards less strict than Goss will suffice for academic
dismissals: "[Elven the 'informal give-and-take' mandated by
Goss ... need not have been provided here."74 The majority
stated its decision was based on lower court precedent75 and rea-
son.76 Lower courts, except in Horowitz, had consistently recog-
nized the difference between academic and disciplinary
Horowitz, although parts of the opinion read as if this less formal hearing
was the only one the Court even considered mandating. See 435 U.S. at 86. In
light of the decision that no hearing at all was required, any discussion of the
requisite formality of a hearing, had one been ordered would have been irrel-
evant.
66. 435 U.S. at 108 (Brennan, J., joining with Blackmun, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 96 (White, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
68. Id. at 98 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
69. Id. at 108 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
70. Id. at 98 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
71. Id. at 97.
72. Id. at 92 (Powell, J., concurring).
73. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens fully joined in
Rehnquist's opinion.
74. 435 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
75. Id. at 87-88 (majority opinion).
76. Id- at 88.
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dismissals, and had held hearings are not necessary in academic
dismissals. 7 Further, the Court concluded that reason demon-
strates academic decisions are not susceptible to meaningful hear-
ings.78
In eliminating a hearing from the elements of procedural due
process, the Court makes a dramatic departure from both tradi-
tional and recent Supreme Court due process doctrine.79 The
holding in Goss built upon procedural due process concepts which
had been developed by the Court in a variety of contexts. While
most due process cases cite to Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy8 0 for the proposition that the mandated proce-
dures for due process vary according to the specific circumstances,
thus implying a hearing may not be necessary, at least notice and
some opportunity to be heard have been found appropriate to vir-
tually every situation.81
77. Id.
78. Id. at 88-90. The analytic process for deciding what process is due, which was
articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), is given scant atten-
tion. See 435 U.S. at 86 n.3. Mathews outlined three factors which are rele-
vant to deciding what process is due: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the
governmental interest, including the burden a hearing would impose; and (3)
the risk of an erroneous deprivation resulting from the procedures used and
the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. 424 U.S. at 335.
79. It is open to speculation whether academic dismissals will continue to be a
unique area or whether Horowitz portends a more general weakening of no-
tice and hearing requirements where some kind of process is due.
80. 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
81. To list the many cases which hold notice and hearing to be essential to proce-
dural due process would require too much space. Highlights include the fol-
lowing: Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prisoners have right to notice
and some opportunity to be heard before disciplinary penalties are imposed);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (some opportunity to be heard must
be afforded prior to revocation of parole); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972) (statutes allowing a private party to obtain a prejudgment writ of re-
plevin through a summary procedure, without prior notice and hearing to the
other party, violate due process); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (unin-
sured motorist may not be deprived of driver's license and registration after
an accident without some opportunity to be heard on whether there is a rea-
sonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him); Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (the state cannot post notice to refuse to
sell alcoholic beverages to individual without affording her notice and an op-
portunity to be heard); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assist-
ance payments cannot be terminated without a prior opportunity for an
evidentiary hearing); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(prejudgment garnishment of wages without notice and prior hearing vio-
lates procedural due process); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951) (United States Attorney General cannot place group on
"Communist" list without notice and opportunity to be heard); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (judicial settlement of
accounts of a trustee cannot be completed without notice to interested par-
ties and opportunity to be heard); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86
[Vol. 58:519
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Prior to Horowitz, procedural due process had been held satis-
fied without a hearing in only a handful of Supreme Court cases.
8 2
The few cases which do exist seem to be the aberration developed
to meet special circumstances. There is no precedent for any gen-
eral proposition that a hearing is not a minimal element of proce-
dural due process. As Roth says, only in "rare and extraordinary
situations [has the Court] held that deprivation of a protected in-
terest need not be preceded by opportunity for some kind of hear-
ing. 83
Perhaps Ingraham v. Wright8 4 was a precursor of the Horowitz
decision. In that case, no hearing, however informal, was found
necessary prior to corporal punishment of public school students.
One of the supporting arguments in Ingraham may provide some
explanation for Horowitz: "But when the State has preserved what
'has always been the law of the land,' the case for administrative
safeguards is significantly less compelling."8 5 It has long been the
"law of the land" that no hearing is necessary for academic dismis-
sals from colleges and universities. 86 The primary rationale for
eliminating a hearing requirement in Ingraham, however, was that
"[pirior hearings might well be dispensed with in many circum-
(1903) (illegal alien cannot be deported without some opportunity to be
heard).
82. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), is the
most notable exception. In that case, the Court held neither notice nor a
hearing was necessary when a cook was excluded from the Naval Gun Fac-
tory, a military installation, as a security risk. The almost absolute authority
of a commanding officer over a military base and the fact that the installation
was making secret weapons cast this decision in a unique light. The govern-
mental interest is far weaker and the private interest is significantly greater
in the academic dismissal of a medical student as compared to a cook's dis-
missal from employment at a military installation. Continued enrollment of
the student creates no risk to the security of the institution, and the tight job
market combined with the high competition for medical school education
makes alternate employment in the field of the individual's choice much
more difficult to obtain. Therefore, McElroy does not seem apt as precedent
for dismissal of a student from a public university for inadequate academic
performance.
The Court has also held that an alien never admitted to this country may
be excluded without a hearing. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537 (1950). But once the alien has been admitted, he or she is enti-
tled to a hearing before expulsion. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590
(1953); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903). The essentiality of a
fair hearing and the other unusual circumstances in which a hearing may be
dispensed with are discussed by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opin-
ion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 165-68
(1951), and in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972).
83. 408 U.S. at 570 n.7.
84. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
85. Id. at 679 (quoting from United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 692 (1964)).
86. See note 88 infra.
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stances in which the state's conduct, if not adequately justified,
would constitute a common law tort. ' 87 That rationale was not
present in Horowitz since Horowitz cannot sue the University of
Missouri for any common law tort arising out of her dismissal.
While the opinion in Horowitz appears to be a radical departure
from prior Supreme Court theory, it follows the traditional, long-
established reasoning of the circuit courts of appeals and a
number of state courts on the subject of academic dismissals. 88
The result reached, and the reasoning followed, is consistent with
that of two circuit courts which have dealt with the problem in re-
cent years. The Tenth Circuit explicitly stated that to satisfy due
process in academic termination cases, the university "need only
advise the student with respect to his deficiencies." 89 The notice
can be in any form. So long as the student knows before dismissal
that he or she has failed or is in danger of failing and dismissal, his
or her due process rights have been adequately protected. Simi-
larly, the Fifth Circuit90 has limited notice and hearing require-
ments to disciplinary cases. A hearing, the court said, "may be
87. 430 U.S. at 679 n.47 (quoting from Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62
CORNELL L REV. 405, 431 (1977) (footnote omitted)).
88. Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d
843 (10th Cir. 1975); Brookins v. Bonnell, 362 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Mus-
tell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 211 So. 2d 489, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968);
Militana v. University of Miami, 236 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Bar-
nard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913). Numer-
ous other decisions have reached the same conclusion, but by a somewhat
different route. Until recently, university actions were not challenged on the
basis of the inadequacy of the procedural protections afforded by the institu-
tion. Students instead simply asked for a court review of the fairness of the
academic dismissal (or refusal to readmit). Most courts refused to review the
decision, in the absence of a showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness or bad
faith, thereby leaving the dismissal effective. See Roberts v. Knowlton, 377 F.
Supp. 1381 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Depperman v. University of Ky., 371 F. Supp. 73
(E.D. Ky. 1974); Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Connelly v.
University of Vt. & State Agric. College, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D.C. Vt. 1965); Wong
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 15 Cal. App. 3d 823, 93 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1971) (dicta);
Cieboter v. O'Connell, 236 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Edde v. Colum-
bia Univ., 8 Misc. 2d 795, 168 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1957), affd, 6 A.D. 780, 175
N.Y.S.2d 556, move to dismiss denied, 5 N.Y.2d 777, 154 N.E.2d 558,180 N.Y.S.2d
298 (1958), appeal dismissed, 5 N.Y.2d 881, 182 N.Y.S.2d 829, cert. denied, 359
U.S. 956 (1959); People ex rel. Jones v. New York Homoepathic Medical
Center College of Medicine, 20 N.Y.S. 379 (Super. Ct. 1892); West v. Board of
Trustees, 41 Ohio App. 367, 181 N.E. 144 (1931); Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193,
55 S.W.2d 805 (1932). See also Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22
VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1070 (1969); Note, Due Process and the University Student-
The Academic/Disciplinary Dichotomy, 37 LA. L. REv. 939, 946-48 (1977).
Contra, Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Pa. 1978);
Sofair v. State Univ., 54 A.D.2d 287, 388 N.Y.S.2d 453, (1976).
89. Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 851 (10th Cir. 1975).
90. Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976).
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useless or harmful in finding out the truth concerning scholarship.
There is a clear dichotomy between a student's due process rights
in disciplinary dismissals and academic dismissals."91 Almost all
courts, except the Eighth Circuit, have held that due process in
academic dismissals does not require a hearing. These courts have
consistently perceived academia as a unique area into which the
courts are ill-equipped to venture. Only the Eighth Circuit had
marked out new ground through its decision in Horowitz,92 and in
one precursor.93 In Horowitz, the Supreme Court could have ex-
tended minimal due process protections of notice and hearing to
academic dismissals, making this area of state action consistent
with others. Instead it chose to continue the traditional exemption
for this class of decisions.
The Supreme Court majority did not spell out what the minimal
protections of this new kind of procedural due process might be.
Instead, it retreated to the most elementary definition of procedu-
ral due process by equating it with fundamental fairness. Al-
though the element of notice still seems to be a requirement, some
more generalized concept of fairness appears to suffice in place of
a hearing. The majority does provide a few clues to what will sat-
isfy procedural due process in the academic context: "The School
fully informed respondent of the faculty's dissatisfaction with her
clinical progress and the danger.., to... continued enrollment.
The ultimate decision. . . was careful and deliberate. These pro-
cedures were sufficient . . . ."94 This indicates that notice, or a
warning, is still essential. Beyond that, "careful and deliberate" 95
are the only guidelines the Court offers.
In contrast, Justice Marshall would apparently distinguish dis-
missals based strictly on failing grades and those based on "con-
91. Id. at 450.
92. 538 F.2d 1317, rehearing denied, 542 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 78
(1978).
93. Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975). In Greenhill, a medical student
at the University of Iowa was dismissed for deficient academic progress, with-
out a prior hearing. The medical school notified the Association of American
Medical Colleges (AAMC) that the reason for the dismissal was "'[1] ack of
intellectual ability or insufficient preparation."' Id.at 7. The Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court and ordered a university hearing. The court said
that "the action by the school in denigrating Greenhill's intellectual ability,
as distinguished from his performance, deprived him of a significant interest
in liberty." Id. at 8. The court focused on the publication of the stigmatizing
statement to AAMC, rather than the fact of dismissal for academic reasons,
as the reason for mandating a hearing. Accord, Ross v. Pennsylvania State
Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Sofair v. State Univ., 54 A.D.2d 287,388
N.Y.S.2d 453, (1976).
94. 435 U.S. at 85.
95. Id.
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duct-related" considerations. 9 6 He would examine "whether 'the
facts disputed are of a type susceptible to determination by third
parties.' "17 His test, applied on an ad hoc basis, could result in
inconsistent decisions to review, depending on whether the stu-
dent failed a sociology class in which the grade was based on an
objective exam or whether he or she failed a different section of
the same course in which the grade was based on class participa-
tion or an evaluation of field work.
Where Justice Marshall would decide what process is due ac-
cording to the facts of a particular case, the Supreme Court major-
ity appears to have applied the same test prospectively to the
kinds of situations it sees as likely to arise. The majority noted
that, in general, most cases of academic dismissal will involve facts
not "susceptible to determination by third parties."'98 While a few
reviewable cases may evade court review, the establishment of a
standard by which both students and universities can plan and
predict was considered of greater importance.
An application of the Horowitz decision to the kinds of
processes employed by universities for academic dismissals
reveals that the following procedures are probably adequate:
1. Dismissal occurs pursuant to published, objective stand-
ards, which specify a requisite grade point average or limit
the number of failing grades.
2. The school always provides for one term of warning or pro-
bationary status before dismissal.
3. Clinical skills or classroom performance are unsatisfactory
and there have been discussions with and/or a warning to
the student during that term.
In these situations, even though the student has no opportunity to
be heard, there is notice either of the standard to be applied, or
that the student is not performing satisfactorily. However, if a
committee or administrator with discretionary power, acting pur-
suant to individualized standards, dismisses a student at the end
of the semester without prior warning of possible failure, it is prob-
able that the Horowitz standard would not be met. This would be
true whether the dismissal was based on grades for written tests or
whether based on an assessment of clinical skills. Such a dismis-
sal would not comply with Horowitz because no advance notice of
any kind was given to the student.
96. 435 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
97. Id.
98. Id.
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V. A RULE WITHOUT A THEORY
A. Disposition by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court skirted the question of whether Horowitz
had a liberty or property interest in continuing her medical educa-
tion.9 9 It strongly indicated that no property interest could be
found because of the difficulty of demonstrating that a property
interest in continued enrollment was recognized by state law.
Since Horowitz did not claim a property interest, however, the
Court was not required to decide the question0oo
It was more difficult to avoid the liberty interest question. Both
petitioner and respondent argued this as a critical issue, devoting a
major segment of their briefs to this topic.' 0 l The Court itself
pointed out: "To be entitled to the procedural protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment, respondent must.., demonstrate that
her dismissal... deprived her of either a 'liberty' or a 'property'
interest."'1 2 Therefore, unless she could show a liberty interest,
Horowitz was not entitled to procedural due process of any kind.
0 3
The Eighth Circuit opinion rested squarely on a finding that
Horowitz's dismissal had deprived her of a liberty interest. 0 4 That
court quoted from Board of Regents v. Roth, 0 5 indicating that a
state action which "'impose[s] . . .a stigma or other disability
that foreclose [s] . . . freedom to take advantage of other employ-
ment opportunities' [is] a deprivation of liberty." 0 6 It concluded
that her "dismissal ... will make it difficult or impossible"107 to
secure admission to another medical school. Since she had ac-
cepted an offer of a position at the University of North Carolina,
conditioned upon securing her M.D., her dismissal meant she
could not take advantage of a firm employment opportunity.108 In
addition, one expert had testified that she would find it difficult to
secure employment in a medically related field because of this
"significant black mark."0 9 The Eighth Circuit found that
"Horowitz has been stigmatized by her dismissal in such a way
that she will be unable to continue her medical education, and her
99. Id. at 84 (majority opinion).
100. Id. at 82.
101. Brief for Petitioner at 14-19; Brief for Respondent at 18-24.
102. 435 U.S. at 82.
103. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
104. 538 F.2d at 1321.
105. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
106. 538 F.2d at 1321 (quoting from Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972)).
107. Id. at 1320.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1320 n.3.
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chances of returning to employment in a medically related field are
severely damaged."" 0 Under the Roth standard applied by the
court, the dismissal had affected her liberty interest, thus invoking
the fourteenth amendment requirement of procedural due proc-
ess.'1 1
Despite the focus of the circuit court's opinion and the parties'
briefs, and despite the need for clarification of this issue, the
Supreme Court declined to answer the liberty interest question af-
ter broadly hinting that no such interest was present." 2 It held
that even if a liberty or property interest was present, the process
provided was sufficient: "Assuming the existence of a liberty or
property interest, [Horowitz] has been awarded at least as much
due process as the Fourteenth Amendment requires."'" 3 The re-
mainder of the opinion assumed the existence of such an interest,
and no concurring opinion disagreed with this assumption.
B. Consequences of Establishing a Liberty Interest
The consequences of a Supreme Court holding that a student
has a liberty interest in continuing a university education are un-
certain. Technically, such a finding need only lead to a require-
ment that the university hold a hearing, and need not involve a
court in a review of the merits on each case. It does not
mean that the courts will interfere with academic evaluations of graduate
students... , but only that medical schools must organize their own ex-
pertise in making decisions... in such a manner as to provide students
with an opportunity to learn of and rebut any factual allegations which
form the basis of the proposed dismissals.
1 14
There is fear, however, that a holding that a liberty interest exists
will "of necessity mean that the courts will... be the final judge of
the qualifications of students to be granted degrees, because if the
Fourteenth Amendment requires such action [notice and a hear-
ing] by the public institutions, it must also require a review on the
merits by the judicial system."" 5
However, a decision clearly establishing a liberty interest
would provide negligible benefits to Horowitz or others similarly
situated because the Horowitz decision implies that even if a lib-
110. Id. at 1321.
111. Id.
112. 435 U.S. at 84-85.
113. Id. at 84-85 (emphasis added).
114. Brief for Respondent at 17, Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975); Sofair v. State Univ., 54
A.D.2d 287, 295, 388 N.Y.S.2d 453, 458 (1976).
115. Brief for Petitioner at 24, Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
See Dessem, Student Due Process Rights in Academic Dismissals from the
Public Schools, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 277, 289 (1976); § VI-A of text infra.
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erty interest is present, the consequence would be merely the right
to notice that the student was in danger of termination for a failing
performance. While the benefit to the student being dismissed for
academic insufficiency would be slight, the burden on the institu-
tion might not be. The burden of providing notice is easily met, but
if the ruling "foment[s] future litigation and subject[s] educa-
tional institutions to unnecessary monitoring and to possible mon-
etary judgments""n 6 the resulting burden might be heavy. In light
of the concern that procedural guarantees may become substan-
tive, the burden on institutions heavy, and the benefits to students
slight, a finding that a liberty interest was present may not have
been believed wise.
Bishop v. Wood,117 however, makes it probable that the Court
would have found that no liberty interest was implicated in
Horowitz had it so inquired, the decision itself strongly implies
this." 8 While Charlotte Horowitz will undoubtedly find it difficult
to secure admission to another medical school and will be at least
somewhat handicapped in efforts to secure certain related employ-
ment, she probably did not suffer the kind of injury intended to be
protected as a liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment.
The Roth and Bishop standard does not encompass every action
by the state which might injure the reputation or employment op-
portunities of the person injured. Roth, read in its entirety, distin-
guishes between dismissals which imply allegations of
"dishonesty, or immorality,"" 9 and dismissals for simple lack of
work performance. The second kind of dismissal, absent publica-
tion of the reasons for the termination, has not been viewed as im-
posing the kind of stigma which gives rise to a liberty interest
violation. The mere fact that it might be difficult for the person
116. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 542 F.2d 1335, 1335 (8th Cir. 1976) (denying
rehearing), rev'd, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). Without proof of actual injury, a student
who sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) for violation of procedural due process
in a dismissal or suspension may recover only nominal damages. Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978). Liability for at least nominal damages exists,
however, if school officials knew or reasonably should have known that the
action they took violated the student's constitutional rights or if they acted
maliciously intending to cause such a violation. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975). Defendants may also be liable for attorney's fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978); Note, Section
1983: An Analysis of Damage Awards, 58 NEB. L REV. 580 (1979).
117. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). See note 47 supra. This analysis utilizes only the portion
of Bishop relating to liberty interest. See 426 U.S. at 347-49. Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976), while relevant and not inconsistent with this analysis, deals
with reputational injury alone, whereas Horowitz claimed not just reputa-
tional injury but also loss of employment and educational opportunities.
118. 435 U.S. at 82-84.
119. 408 U.S. at 573.
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discharged to secure other employment is not sufficient to give rise
to a liberty interest.
120
The public employment principles, as clarified in Bishop v.
Wood,121 when analogized to student dismissals, may mean that
the liberty interest is not intended to protect mere dismissals for
insufficiency of academic performance. Unless the university does
more than simply dismiss, or takes some other active step to im-
pose a stigma upon the student which forecloses his or her oppor-
tunity for further schooling or employment, the university may not
have violated a liberty interest.122 The logical, but somewhat spec-
ulative, consequences of the dismissal alone would not be suffi-
cient to trigger procedural due process rights.
If in fact Horowitz had no liberty interest violated by this dis-
missal, it is difficult to understand why the Supreme Court did not
simply say so. The most likely reason for its silence may be its fear
that a definitive answer would undermine the due process princi-
ples established for disciplinary dismissals in post secondary insti-
tutions. Since Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,23
lower federal and state courts have required quite formal procedu-
ral protections before a student may be dismissed for misconduct
from either universities or public elementary and secondary
schools.124 This line of cases evolved before the Supreme Court
developed the liberty and property interest criteria for applying
procedural due process to governmental actions. The Supreme
Court merely adopted the lower courts' holdings regarding dismis-
sals for misconduct in Goss v. Lopez, 25 and that decision rested
primarily on a finding of a property interest. 2 6 Students at col-
leges and universities have not established a property interest in
their continued education beyond the current term for which regis-
tered.127 If the Court decides there is no liberty interest, then
120. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). See also LaBorde v. Franklin Parish
School Bd., 510 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1975); Blair v. Board of Regents, 496 F.2d 322
(6th Cir. 1975); Russell v. Hodges, 470 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1972); Dessem, supra
note 115, at 286-87, esp. n.74.
121. 426 U.S. 341 (1976). See note 47 supra.
122. UMXC consciously refused to divulge the reasons for Horowitz's dismissal to
anyone; UMKC did not impose any stigmatizing labels in any records which
would normally be distributed to the Association of American Medical Col-
leges (AAMC) or to other schools or potential employers at Horowitz's re-
quest. Cf. Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975) (informing AAMC of
student's intellectual deficiencies violated liberty interest). See note 93
supra.
123. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
124. See note 6 supra.
125. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
126. Id. at 572-74. The Goss reliance on a liberty interest is at least made question-
able by Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976).
127. Only in Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975), and Ross v. Penn-
sylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Pa. 1978), did the courts find that
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there is no foundation for requiring procedural due process for dis-
ciplinary dismissals from colleges and universities. It might be
better to leave the liberty interest question unresolved in order to
avoid a resurgence of challenges to established legal principles in
the student misconduct area. Evasion of the question is especially
appropriate if the Court anticipates that students might success-
fully demonstrate a property interest. Since Horowitz did not ar-
gue that she had a property interest, it would have been difficult
for the Court to posit one for her. Yet if the Court believed she
could have shown such an interest, it was neither fair nor efficient
to rely on a spurious issue to resolve the case.
Other universities, wishing to plan on the basis of Horowitz,
must apparently assume a liberty interest does exist, at least in
professional school enrollment. Whether other graduate colleges,
and even more speculatively whether undergraduate colleges,
must also assume their students can demonstrate such a liberty
interest is uncertain. But in light of the minimal consequences
upon the dismissal process which a liberty interest imposes, the
burden upon the university of assuming such a liberty interest ex-
ists is so slight as to be almost non-existent. It simply makes no
practical difference to the institution whether or not such a liberty
interest exists since "this sort of minimum requirement will im-
pose no burden that is not already being shouldered and dis-
charged by responsible institutions."' 28
VI. THE SCHOOL-COURT RELATIONSHIP:
ARE SCHOOLS UNIQUE?
The historical reluctance of the courts to become involved in
academic matters' 29 arises from a number of distinct but converg-
ing concerns. First is the assumption that ordering procedural pro-
tections will involve the courts in a review of the merits of the
decisions which result. Following from that is the premise that the
courts are not capable of wisely substituting their judgments for
an institution's decisions about academic performance. Less
talked about, but certainly as strong an influence, is the belief that
imposing a hearing requirement on the university itself would de-
mand the impossible. Even if the courts could restrict their in-
volvement strictly to the imposition of procedural safeguards,
requiring a hearing before an academic dismissal would still be un-
wise. These then are the premises which should be examined. 30
the complaining student had a property interest in continuing enrollment.
See note 7 supra.
128. 435 U.S. at 97 (White, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
129. See note 88 supra.
130. In addition to these primary concerns, other factors play an influential, but
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Further analysis will show each of them to be vulnerable in vary-
ing degrees.
A. Whether Court Review of Procedure Necessarily Leads to Court
Review of the Merits of the School Decision
Court decisions focus primarily on the second premise, that
courts are not fully capable of substituting their judgment for that
of educators. 13 1 This assumes, however, an affirmative answer to
less determinative role. Even if a court were convinced that mandating a
hearing would not involve it in reviewing the merits of academic dismissals, it
must at least be prepared to answer further questions about procedure.
Since the courts began to mandate hearings for misconduct dismissals (as
well as hearings in other settings), there have been myriad suits to clarify the
procedures which must be followed at the hearings. See, e.g., note 6 supra.
How formal the hearing must be, whether the student must be allowed legal
counsel, the need for a permanent record of the hearing, and many other is-
sues have been brought to the courts for resolution. Answers to these ques-
tions in the academic dismissal context require a knowledge of how decisions
are presently made within institutions, and what alternatives are possible
within the academic framework. Judges, together with many others outside
academia, do not know what academic administrators or faculty do and what
procedures are feasible within the academic environment. Hence, there is a
great deal of uncertainty about which differing means of resolving these
questions would provide for the best interests of the students and institu-
tions. While this uncertainty alone would probably not dictate a decision that
courts should not become involved, or that no hearing is necessary, it may tip
the balance enough to explain the ultimate decision where other difficult fac-
tors are involved.
Courts have also been reluctant to intervene in academic matters because
they perceive the teacher-student role as a cooperative one which can best be
nurtured by being left alone. See 435 U.S. at 90-91 & n.6. See also Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 594-95 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting); Note, Due Process
and Student Suspensions--Goss v. Lopez, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 266, 270-71(1975).
While there may be some merit to this argument in small institutions or pub-
lic elementary and secondary schools where continued attendance is man-
dated, there is little validity to it in the large university setting where the
personal relationship between faculty and student is not essential.
Certainly the relationship should not be an adversary one. See 435 U.S. at
90-91 n.6. But it is difficult to see how either a mandated university hearing or
a court review of academic dismissals will contribute to this. Any student
with a grievance serious enough to make him consider court action is not
likely still to see the university as friend or mentor. By the time the argu-
ment becomes this serious, the student and institution are already adversa-
ries. The only question is whether the courts will ensure a somewhat neutral
decision maker or whether the university will automatically win. Knowledge
of an automatic victory by the university, rather than encouraging a more
cooperative relationship, is likely only to provoke greater bitterness and hos-
tility. In the long run, a neutral referee may promote the most healthy rela-
tionship.
131. Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5,9 (8th Cir. 1975); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843,
851 (10th Cir. 1975); Depperman v. University of Ky., 371 F. Supp. 73, 76 (E.D.
Ky. 1974); Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936, 940 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Connelly v.
[Vol. 58:519
ACADEMIC DISMISSALS
the threshold question, i.e., whether requiring due process within
the institution would necessitate court review of the merits of the
dismissal. Most courts which have heard academic cases and
found in favor of the university have based their decision at least
in part on the belief that court review on the merits would be re-
quired.132 Although the fact that so many courts assume this
would be a necessary outcome must be given some weight, no
court has explained why it believes this assumption warranted.
The existence of a liberty or property interest carries with it
only the consequence of procedural due process. 33 As the remedy
prescribed by the Eighth Circuit in Horowitz indicates, 34 a finding
of a violation of procedural due process leads only to an order to
the institution to remedy the defect, e.g., to conduct a hearing. In
-fact, however, the ramifications of finding a liberty or property in-
terest may go much further. Where no procedural due process is
required, a person may be fired or dismissed or lose a benefit with-
out the reasons for the decision being given to him or her. Once
notice and hearing are required, the necessary implication is that
the notice will contain the reasons for the termination.
135
Even without a finding of a liberty or property interest, courts
may still agree to review an academic dismissal which was arbi-
trary, capricious, or in bad faith, but the burden of showing that
the decision falls into one of these categories is upon the plain-
tiff.136 Once a liberty interest is found, or a hearing mandated, so
that the institution must given reasons for its action, the plaintiff
University of Vt. & State Agric. College, 244 F. Supp. 156,160-61 (D.C. Vt. 1965);
Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626, 627-28 (D. Mass. 1957); Wong v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 15 Cal. App. 3d 823, 830-31, 93 Cal. Rptr. 502, 508-09
(1971); Militana v. University of Miami, 236 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970); Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19,22, 102 N.E. 1095, 1097
(1913); Sofair v. State Univ., 54 A.D.2d 287, 295, 388 N.Y.S.2d 453, 458 (1976);
People ex rel. Jones v. New York Homoepathic Medical Center College of
Medicine, 20 N.Y.S. 379, 380 (Super. Ct. 1892).
132. Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 851 (10th Cir. 1975); Brookins v. Bonnell, 362 F.
Supp. 379, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936, 939-40 (S.D.
Tex. 1973); Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agric. College, 244 F. Supp.
156, 160 (D.C. Vt. 1965); Dehaan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626, 627-28 (D.
Mass. 1957); Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 15 Cal. App. 3d 823, 830-31, 93
Cal. Rptr. 502, 508-09 (1971); Militana v. University of Miami, 236 So. 2d 162, 164
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); West v. Board of Trustees, 41 Ohio App. 367, 384, 181
N.E. 144, 150 (1931); People ex rel. Jones v. New York Homoepathic Medical
Center College of Medicine, 20 N.Y.S. 379, 380 (Super. Ct. 1892).
133. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972); Sofair v. State Univ., 54 A.D.2d
287, 295, 388 N.Y.S.2d 453, 458 (1976). See also text accompanying notes 114-16
supra.
134. 538 F.2d at 1321.
135. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
136. Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agric. College, 244 F. Supp. 156, 160 (D.C.
Vt. 1965).
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can more easily meet that burden by using the information pro-
vided by the institution. Thus, the consequences of awarding pro-
cedural rights may quickly become substantive.
Although the finding of a liberty or property interest may lead
to court review of the merits of more cases,137 the basis for this
review need not change. The same standard which now deter-
mines whether the court will examine the merits (arbitrary, capri-
cious or bad faith) will continue to be applied. Even if the
standard of review were less stringent, the court would normally
use the record already prepared at the university hearing as the
basis for its decision. A court would "substitute its judgment" only
in cases where the applicable standard of review is de novo or de
novo on the record. In all other cases, where the standard is sub-
stantial evidence, or some variation thereof, courts will rely on the
record already created and will give at least some (and probably
considerable) weight to the decision of the initial administrative
tribunal.13 8 In practice, this is the form of review which will occur
in nearly all cases in state courts, and a federal court would not
reverse, on due process grounds, if this procedure were followed.
The guarantee of procedural due process would only assist a
student to secure the information needed to build a case. While a
guarantee of a hearing might in fact involve the court in more aca-
demic cases, it need in no way change the basis of the review from
that which now exists, and would not involve courts in substituting
their judgment for that of university officials.
B. Whether Courts are Competent to Review the Merits of the School
Decision
If the courts simply impose a framework of procedure within
which the university continues to determine questions of aca-
demic standards, then rhetoric about court interference in the in-
ternal operations of the institution is irrelevant. But if in fact
procedural rights carry with them increased substantive rights,
then whether the courts are competent to evaluate these substan-
tive rights becomes a critical question.
While innumerable cases tell the litigants that educational deci-
sions are special and the courts should not intervene, 3 9 an articu-
lation of why they are special is extremely difficult to find. Most
cases refer to Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne'40 and Connelly
137. Perhaps the courts fear that once institutions give reasons for dismissals, it
will be apparent that many of these actions are arbitrary or at least without
substantial foundation.
138. See, e.g., MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT § 15(g) (1961).
139. See note 88 supra.
140. 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913).
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v. University of Vermont & State Agricultural College14 ' and sim-
ply recite their conclusions. Connelly makes the only serious at-
tempt to explain why the courts should let school officials be the
final arbiters of academic qualifications or performance:
The reason for this rule is that in matters of scholarship, the school au-
thorities are uniquely qualified by training and experience to judge the
qualifications of a student, and efficiency of instruction depends in no
small degree upon the school faculty's freedom from interference from
other non-educational tribunals. It is only when the school authorities
abuse this discretion that a court may interfere with their decision to dis-
miss a student.
The rule of judicial nonintervention in scholastic affairs is particularly
applicable in the case of a medical school A medical school must be the
judge of the qualifications of its students to be granted a degree; Courts
are not supposed to be learned in medicine and are not qualified to pass
opinion as to the attainments of a student in medicine.... Whether the
plaintiff should or should not have received a passing grade for the period
in question is a matter wholly within the jurisdiction of the school authori-
ties, who alone are qualified to make such a determination. The subject
matter... is not a subject for judicial review .... 142
The courts view academic dismissals as qualitatively different
from disciplinary dismissals. 143 While disciplinary matters are
somewhat analogous to the kind of fact finding in which courts nor-
mally engage, the adjudication of academic issues is seen as re-
quiring a different kind of knowledge and approach to problem
solving.144 While a misconduct dismissal usually focuses on be-
havior at a given time, academic dismissals are likely to be based
on cumulative behavior and performance throughout one or sev-
eral terms. Even the questions of fact-whether the student an-
swered an essay examination question correctly-may often not
be as objectively answerable as the question of whether a student
stole some money. In both academic and disciplinary situations,
the questions can be broken down ultimately into questions of
fact. But the intermediate steps between the facts and the deci-
sion may be more numerous where an academic dismissal is in-
volved. The interpretation of those facts through a process of
141. 244 F. Supp. 156 (D.C. Vt. 1965).
142. Id. at 160-61.
143. See Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 449-50 (5th Cir. 1976); Greenhill v.
Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 8 (8th Cir. 1975); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 849-50 (10th
Cir. 1975); Brookins v. Bormell, 362 F. Supp. 379,382 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Mustell v.
Rose, 282 Ala. 358,211 So. 2d 489,497-98, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968); Wong
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 15 Cal. App. 3d 823, 831-32, 93 Cal. Rptr. 502, 507-08
(1971); Cieboter v. O'Connell, 236 So. 2d 470, 472-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970);
Militana v. University of Miami, 236 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970);
Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 22, 102 N.E. 1095, 1097
(1913); Sofair v. State Univ., 54 A.D.2d 287, 295, 388 N.Y.S.2d 453, 458 (1976).
144. Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936, 940 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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judgment by the professor and then by a review committee is more
complex than the interpretation by a witness in a misconduct
case.1
4 5
How can a judge, untrained in chemistry, evaluate whether in
fact this examination or research paper is worthy of a B or an F 14 6
or assess whether these grades indicate that the student is capable
of serving as a physician or dentist? The court does not have ready
access to this kind of expertise. And if it secures the services of an
expert to review a final examination, outsiders cannot apply the
standards of a particular faculty member or institution. As the
Horowitz case makes evident, an increasing number of challenges
to academic decisions involve not the grading of exams but rather
the assessment of behavioral demonstrations of competence which
have occurred over time. No expert can review and assess activi-
ties which have been completed and which leave no tangible prod-
uct. If competence to perform a task were the only thing being
evaluated, the problem would be difficult enough. But the grades
which lead to the academic dismissal are not based on what stu-
dents can accomplish, but rather on what they did accomplish.
Even if students know and can apply good clinical skills, if they did
not in fact demonstrate them to the instructor during the past se-
mester, few would argue that they should pass the course.
While certain standards must be common to all professional
preparation programs, variety of methodology and detail are ac-
cepted. Above the minimum established level, institutions should
be able to apply their own standards. Court review would almost
necessarily promote conformity, thereby curbing experiment and
excellence. 147
It is important to recognize, however, that all academic evalua-
145. See 435 U.S. at 88 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring).
146. Abbariao v. Hamline Univ. School of Law, - Minn. -, -, 258 N.W.2d 108, 112
(1977).
147. Courts could (and sometimes do) separate the decision to give a failing grade
from the decision to dismiss. See, e.g., Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d
Cir. 1972), which distinguished the process which must be available for ap-
peal of demerits given during a semester, and the process needed when de-
merits accumulate enough to raise the question of dismissal. Courts could
refuse to review the correctness of a particular grade (unless the student can
meet the burden of showing arbitrariness, capriciousness, or bad faith), and
only review the decision to terminate the student. See Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F.
Supp. 936, 939-40 (S.D. Tex. 1973). But the decision to dismiss is still highly
subjective, especially at professional schools, where a variety of combina-
tions may lead a faculty committee to believe one student will make an ade-
quate dentist while another will not. Perhaps colleges should have to set out
more objective standards for grade failures or academic dismissals. How-
ever, they should not be forced upon the university for the sake of judicial
convenience, unless it is certain they will also strengthen (or at least not
weaken) the academic soundness of the course of study. But faculty, as well
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tions are based on facts and conduct. The student is dismissed for
what he or she has done or has neglected to do. Even where gen-
eral suitability for a profession is the issue (what a student is),
this can only be discovered through his or her conduct. Although
it may be difficult to explain what conduct led to the judgment that
the student should be dismissed, such conduct must have occurred
if the dismissal is not to be completely arbitrary. Courts (and edu-
cators) must recognize that faculty and administrators have no
mysterious, specialized methods of evaluating students. Overly
simplistic distinctions based on the conduct-academic deficiency
dichotomy do not further the resolution of the problem.
Clearly, the difficulties of court review must be balanced
against the consequences of judicial non-intervention. If court re-
view will involve judges in reviewing academic decisions on the
merits, there are serious problems. Yet it is questionable whether
the difficulties are too great to be overcome, particularly since the
student's interest is not insignificant. The educational judgments
which courts would make if they accepted review of academic dis-
missals seem no more complex than those made in antitrust, envi-
ronmental or discrimination suits, and would similarly require
expertise on the part of the court.
C. Whether a University Can Conduct a Meaningful Hearing
Decisions have focused almost exclusively upon the ability of
the court to review academic dismissals. Ignored in most discus-
sions, but certainly of critical importance in any decision to impose
a hearing requirement upon a university, is whether or not it is
possible for the university to hold a meaningful hearing. 48
Many of the same factors influencing reviewability by the court
also arise in the context of an on-campus hearing procedure. Just
as the courts have difficulty reviewing the fairness of a subjective
grade, so too do campus review committees. Only the instructor is
present during classes and thus capable of assigning a grade for
class participation. Even if it is determined to allow other faculty
to re-grade the paper and/or exam, a small college may not have
any other faculty competent to review that particular subject mat-
ter. And it seems improbable that faculty who know little about
the subject matter can adequately assess a student's knowledge of
the material.
as students, courts and the public seem to be presently convinced that accu-
rate, objective means of assessment are not available.
148. The Horowitz decision does seem to be based partially on these grounds. 435
U.S. at 88-89. See also Mahavongsanarfv. Hall, 529 F.2d 448,450 (5th Cir. 1976);
Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 22, 102 N.E. 1095, 1097
(1913).
1979]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
At some point the right granted to a student to appeal a grade
collides with the right of the instructor to academic freedom.
14 9
Review by a campus committee or by a court comes dangerously
close to chilling the speech of the teacher within the classroom by
dictating at least the methodology which must be used.i5 0 Fear of
having to prove the validity of every grade before a panel com-
posed of faculty from other disciplines may encourage adoption of
objective tests even where they are not suitable to the subject mat-
ter. Again, innovation and excellence may be stifled.
Questions of fact can be more easily reviewed by a campus
hearing procedure. A hearing could quite readily resolve ques-
tions about the accuracy of the recording of a grade, or whether a
warning was given prior to dismissal. A campus hearing could also
deal with evidentiary matters to determine whether a dismissal or
a failing grade was actually the result of misconduct rather than
inadequate academic performance.
A campus hearing body would be more capable than a court of
deciding cases where a student claims his poor performance in-
volved extenuating circumstances, such as illness. The campus
board would have a reserve of past experience to help it decide the
likelihood of a student's success if given a second chance.
The university review committee has another advantage over a
court: its members are familiar with the academic standards and
processes of the institution. The members have an experiential
background which allows them to put testimony into context, and
are better able to judge how important certain skills or attitudes
are in the particular profession. Of course, there are variations in
approaches within every institution. Every instructor would not
give the same grade for the same work, but the faculty may have a
more meaningful concept of what grade disparity is great enough
to amount to an abuse of discretion.
The purposes of a hearing are multiple. While ability to resolve
an issue through a particular process should be fundamental to
any decision to require it, other factors are also important. A hear-
ing may make the persons involved feel that justice has been
done.1 5 ' An opportunity for a hearing may satisfy the student's
need to have someone impartial listen and have a long-term im-
pact on the sense of fairness which pervades the entire campus
149. Grace, Academic Freedom versus Student Rights, 5 NOLPE SCHOOL L.J. 110,
110-11 (1975); Young, Due Process in the Classroom, 1 JJ. & EDUC. 65, 70
(1972).
150. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967): "[The] First
Amendment... does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom." Orthodoxy can be as effectively imposed by delimiting methods
of grading and hence of teaching as by direct controls on what can be taught
151. Dessem, supra note 115, at 293-94.
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community. A sense that one will not be dealt with arbitrarily can
promote security and a sense of community.
In addition, a hearing would make the university more account-
able by encouraging a more careful assessment of the real reasons
for a decision. It would permit internal correction of any inadver-
tent or careless errors. Where the initial decision was clearly cor-
rect, little burden would be imposed on the institution; where the
initial decision was questionable, the institution should not be ad-
verse to a careful review before causing serious injury to a stu-
dent.
5 2
Another function of a hearing requirement is the creation of a
record for court use if the matter later comes to litigation.153 A
campus hearing can produce the facts and statements of involved
parties. It can also conserve judicial time and effort since the is-
sues can be tried on the already existing record, with little need for
supplementation. Even if the only basis for court review is arbi-
trariness, a record enables the court better to decide whether the
facts will sustain such a charge.
These latter functions can be well served by an on-campus
hearing prior5 4 to an academic dismissal. Especially where the
grounds for appeal are extenuating circumstances or a question of
fact, but also where more complex questions of judgment are in-
volved, the student-and other students-will have a greater ten-
152. Some administrators report that the imposition of procedural requirements
has made decisions regarding both students and faculty harsher. It is
claimed that the frustration with procedures perceived to be unnecessary,
combined with the necessity to be prepared to defend the decision before the
courts, leads to anger and antagonism which takes the form of a harsh deci-
sion against the person seeking the review. Whether this perception is accu-
rate and whether, if it is, the result is temporary would seem to deserve close
attention.
153. Dessem, supra note 115, at 293-94.
154. It is possible that a post-dismissal right of appeal, if it could be completed
before commencement of the next semester, would suffice. Educators point
out that, in fact, most of those dismissed do not appeal. The students often
expect the dismissal, sometimes even welcome it---'The college kicked me
out; now I don't have to decide to quit." While these students probably would
not take advantage of a predismissal hearing opportunity, time delays and
uncertainty would require the college to hold class seats open for all those
considered for dismissal. This in turn would deprive other students of the
opportunity to be admitted either to the institution or to a particular class.
Notice of dismissal which also notifies of a right to file a notice of appeal
within one week could satisfy the needs of the institution and also the inter-
ests of the student. It would allow the institution to clear its records of the
dismissed students who did not appeal, thereby opening most of the class-
room and dormitory spaces which would be available. The small number of
students who wished to appeal could do so before the next term began, so
that they would in no way be injured by the post-, rather than pre-, dismissal
hearing. See, e.g., Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975).
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dency to believe that justice has been done and, in addition, a
record will have been created for use if the case continues into the
courts.
The hardest problems remain. They are especially difficult in
areas where "conduct" and "clinical skills" merge. The case of a
medical student who repeatedly fails to wash his or her hands
before examining a patient, or a clinical psychology student who
hallucinates at unpredictable times presents both a question of
fact (whether he or she engages in such conduct) and a question of
judgment (how much weight the behavior should be given). Even
more difficult to deal with is the student who is dismissed for atti-
tudinal and personality faults which are believed critical to a par-
ticular profession. 5 5 These failures may either be reflected in a
failing grade or may be assessed outside the grading structure as
in Horowitz. Listening skills and rapport with clients or patients
are often as important to the competence of a social worker or phy-
sician as are diagnostic skills. An apparent dislike of children or a
tendency to instill great fear in children is fatal to successful teach-
ing. These weaknesses appear over time as a supervisor observes
the student in a variety of situations and circumstances. It is ex-
tremely difficult, f not impossible, for a review committee or a
court to second guess the on-site supervisors. It is also difficult for
a supervisor to communicate to a committee or court the specific
grounds for a conclusion that the student is not suited for a partic-
ulbr profession. When translated into specific instances of con-
duct, the criticisms may appear petty or unsubstantiated.
On the other hand, it is because evaluation of clinical skills and
attitudes is so subjective that the evaluation ought to be subject to
some review. This will force faculty members to articulate to
themselves as well as to students the inadequacies on which deci-
sions are based. Subjective evaluations are harder; where faculty
choose to use this method, or where it is necessary, they must
carry the burden of exercising more care in evaluating and in com-
municating the results of the evaluation to the student.
In fact, most dismissals are reviewed or decided upon by a
faculty committee prior to implementation. The question is only
whether the student whose record is under review will be allowed
to attend the meeting and present his or her side of the story. It is
difficult to believe that offering this opportunity to the student will
interfere with fair decision making. The potential injury to the stu-
dent is great enough to justify any administrative inconvenience
and delay which a hearing may entail. While imperfect and diffi-
155. See Toombs & DiBiase, College Rules and Court Decisions: Notes on Student
Dismissal, 2 J.C. & U. 355, 362-63 (1975).
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cult, it would seem worth the effort to afford some hearing opportu-
nity for the student dismissed for those reasons.
Rather than avoid an on-campus hearing altogether, it would be
preferable to require a hearing but to resolve the problems
presented through allocation of the burden of proof and creation of
a standard of review. In academic dismissal hearings, grades could
be assumed to be fair, unless the student can show sufficient evi-
dence of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or bad faith. Alternately, a
separate hearing could be conducted for any grade appeal prior to
a hearing on dismissal. The hearing body could use a standard of
clearly wrong in determining whether a grade or a clinical evalua-
tion should be changed, but the university would be required to
present sufficient evidence at the hearing to justify dismissal of the
student. While it is arguable that faculty should not be forced to
carry a heavy burden of proof for every failing grade, certainly the
university ought to be able to carry this burden of showing that an
individual should be dismissed before such a serious penalty is im-
posed. "It is obvious that colleges are not courts, and academic
deans are not prosecutors; however, both can provide clearly de-
fined requirements and procedures to ensure fair play, thus satis-
fying both procedural and substantive aspects of due process."'
15 6
While not easy and not perfect, an on-campus hearing on aca-
demic dismissals need not be an exercise in futility. It can resolve
many factual issues and serve as a check on questions of judg-
ment; it can nurture a feeling that fairness will occur; and it can
create a record for cases which proceed to litigation. It certainly
will not be "harmful in finding out the truth concerning scholar-
ship."1
5 7
D. Schools Do Not Require Special Due Process Standards
The obstacles to imposition of a hearing prior to academic dis-
missals are far less formidable than the courts and some academi-
cians allege them to be. Universities can conduct meaningful
hearings on academic performance even in clinical programs like
medicine. Whether imposition of a hearing requirement must lead
to greater court review of the merits of such dismissals is doubtful.
If substantive review does result, the courts will have great diffi-
culty making decisions about subjects foreign to them. But as they
have found ways to deal with highly technical matters in other
kinds of suits, so too can they master the intricacies of academia.
Lastly, if courts limit their involvement to questions of procedure,
they can find answers to questions about the formality of the hear-
156. Young, supra note 149, at 68.
157. Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1976).
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ing fully as successfully as they have in the disciplinary dismissal
area.
The Supreme Court has weighed these arguments and decided
that judicial non-intervention in academic dismissals should con-
tinue. Only notice is required to provide adequate procedural due
process. Future student challenges must continue to allege arbi-
trariness, capriciousness, or bad faith, the violation of a constitu-
tional right, or-since Horowitz-failure of notice. Efforts to
change university procedures must focus internally. Students
must convince educators that a hearing process prior to dismissal
should be set up, not because the courts have mandated it, but be-
cause it is fair or because it will work well.
VIL CONCLUSION
As with most Supreme Court decisions in a new area, the an-
swers in Horowitz lead to a list of additional questions. The
Horowitz decision will have little direct impact on public elemen-
tary and secondary schools, since by virtue of compulsory attend-
ance laws, public schools cannot usually dismiss a student for
academic failure. 5 8 Some of the questions evolving from Horowitz
will, however, arise at both the public school and university levels,
for example, its effect on court challenges to grades in a particular
course. 5 9 Although grade appeals would not necessitate more
process than academic dismissals, it is unsettled whether they
would require as much.160 It is possible an appeal of a single, alleg-
158. Where public schools dismiss students who are beyond the compulsory age
of attendance on the ground that they are not making satisfactory progress
towards a diploma, Horowitz would seem fully applicable.
159. Most challenges thus far have attacked specific grades only where they lead
to a dismissaL No reported cases have been found where appeal was based
solely on an alleged unfair grade. In Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.
Tex. 1973), plaintiff specifically asked the court to order a grade changed, but
the court declined. The court in Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agric.
College, 244 F. Supp. 156 (D.C. Vt. 1965), categorically refused to review the
fairness of any particular grade. The plaintiff in Hill v. Trustees of Ind. Univ.,
537 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1976), challenged a failing grade, but the grade was
based on plagiarism, which would probably trigger misconduct due process
requirements. See note 163 & accompanying text infra.
160. In Knight v. Board of Educ., 38 Ill App. 3d 603, 348 N.E.2d 299 (1976), the court
said lowering a student's grade by one letter in one quarter, because of tru-
ancy, was not so harsh as to deprive him of substantive due process. In Dep-
perman v. University of Ky., 371 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. Ky. 1974), the court refused
to review proceedings which had led to probation because probation was not
a sanction rising to the level of a constitutional infringement. Id. at 75. See
also Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 462 F.2d 463, 470 (3d Cir. 1972). Simi-
larly, some courts view Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), as not applying to
the separate components of the educational process. See, e.g., Albach v. Odle,
531 F.2d 983, 985 (10th Cir. 1976) (barred from participation in athletics); Fen-
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edly unfair grade would be seen as de minimis, and simply never
be reviewed by a court. Where a single failing grade leads to other
serious loss, though short of dismissal,16 1 it is difficult to view it as
de minimis. To be safe, a teacher should provide notice to stu-
dents of the standards to be applied in grading each course. This
would protect both failing grades and passing grades which a stu-
dent believed were too low. A warning to the student at least once
before giving a failing grade would also probably suffice to meet
the Horowitz standard. Such a warning may be essential in a
course where grading is highly subjective.
The line between dismissal for academic failure and for miscon-
duct remains undefined. Lower courts have indicated they will
take a strict line on this distinction. 16 2 Cheating and plagiarism,
for example, will be considered misconduct. 163 Similarly, depriva-
tion of an academic privilege as a disciplinary measure for conduct
rule infractions has been held subject to misconduct procedural
due process standards. l 4 But at what point personal conduct be-
comes properly a part of the academic requirements of an institu-
tion remains a most hazy issue.165 This distinction, wherever it is
drawn, is likely to have an impact on both public elementary and
secondary schools and public universities.
Horowitz dealt with a dismissal at the end of a semester. It is
unknown if procedures must be any different if a student is dis-
missed from a class or from the institution during a term.
166 Sup-
pose, for example, a teacher dropped a student from a course in
ton v. Stear, 423 F. Supp. 767, 771 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (in-school suspension and
forfeiture of class trip); Dallam v. Cumberland Valley School Dist., 391 F.
Supp. 358, 361 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (barred from participation in athletics). But
see Warren v. National Ass'n of Secondary School Principals, 375 F. Supp.
1043 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (dismissal from a high school honor society for miscon-
duct required procedural due process).
161. For example, a student might lose his or her eligibility for the basketball
team, for participation in a prestigious extra-curricular activity, or for a part
time job at the school
162. See Brookins v. Bonnell, 362 F. Supp. 379 (ED. Pa. 1973); Woody v. Burns, 188
So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Toombs & DiBiase, supra note 155, at 358,
361-62.
163. McDonald v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 375 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Ill. 1974);
Roberts v. Knowlton, 377 F. Supp. 1381 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
164. Warren v. National Ass'n of Secondary School Principals, 375 F. Supp. 1043
(NJ). Tex. 1974) (removal from honor society).
165. See Cieboter v. O'Connell, 236 So. 2d 470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Bower v.
O'Reilly, 65 Misc. 2d 578, 318 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Grace, supra note
149, at 120; Toombs v. DiBiase, supra note 155, at 362-64.
166. Miller v. Dailey, 136 Cal. 212,68 P. 1029 (1902) (studenit dismissed during stu-
dent teaching because supervisors believed him unfit to be a teacher, but
court issued mandamus reinstating him stating he must be allowed to finish
the course he had begun); West v. Board of Trustees, 41 Ohio App. 367, 181
N.E. 144 (1931) (student dropped at mid-term of semester, but court upheld
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the middle of a term because he did not turn in a required paper.
Is this misconduct or academic insufficiency? Is a warning neces-
sary?
One of the most pressing questions is what process is necessary
before a school can restrict participation in extracurricular activi-
ties because of poor academic performance. If this is considered
an academic matter, notice of the standard to be applied will be
sufficient. If, however, this is seen as a disciplinary measure, some
form of hearing may be required.
167
In order to avoid mandating formal hearings prior to all aca-
demic dismissals, the Supreme Court has eliminated hearing re-
quirements from the necessary procedural protections. While the
Court points out that less formal opportunities to be heard often
satisfy the hearing requirement in certain contexts, its opinion
seems to lose sight of this fact. The options are presented as either
no hearing at all or a formal, adversary hearing. The Court chooses
the first option as more reasonable and as consistent with histori-
cal practice.
Although probably not required by the facts of the case at hand,
and in the face of wide disagreement among the justices of the
Court, a fragile majority has affirmed that academic dismissals do
not necessitate the same kind of procedural protections which dis-
ciplinary dismissals demand.
The question is undoubtedly a hard one, but the consequences
of mandating some kind of hearing for academic dismissals, upon
careful examination, are not as dire as painted by the courts and
educators. Such hearings might actually be healthy for universi-
ties, especially if only an informal opportunity to be heard were
mandated.
Most observers would agree that Charlotte Horowitz was fairly
dealt with; what is regrettable is that five justices of the Court said
she was given more process than necessary. The spectre of sud-
den, impersonal dismissals based upon an obscure provision in a
university catalogue is real indeed. For despite talk about going
beyond court requirements to comply with moral mandates, too
often the legal minimum becomes the maximum.
Eileen K. Jennings '79
dismissal as not unduly harsh because she had been on probation since start
of semester).
167. See note 5 supra.
[Vol. 58:519
